Anyone with a negative take on a veTokenomics structure? Tell me all about it... Lets go ????

OK, I've not studied it a lot yet, but: So some hot takes to burn me with:

1) if coupled with large inflation disadvantages passive holders.

2) if coupled with voting rights disenfranchised those who can not lock.

3) pulls tokens out of market liquidity - thin markets may discourage some entry.

4) 4 year lock ups force portfolio construction decisions (do you buy more if you want flexibility)

5) Gas cost to stake on L1

6) Discourages small traders who are entering crypto.

7) discourages use of L2 - why maintain liquidity on L2, when goal is to lock on L1?

It is certainly not liquid in veCRV model. There is wrappers around veCRV that can be traded. Like cvxCRV, but still, nothing like the original governance token.

Assuming it's favoring staking over non-staking, I think the ve model decreases the price of the token due to the liquidity premium (you need to lock to get the "correct" total return). So, not all token holders are treated the same. It certainly favours those who can afford the time lock.

It encourages the aggregation of vote power to a select few entities (e.g. votemak, redacted, etc) which hurts self sovereignty.

Voting system based on such tokenomics optimizes voting on pools that token holders expect to generate most fees (since their fee stream is generated only from these pools).

It is good since it allows to allocate token emission resources to support pools that are really used.

But here is a question that remains to be answered - could such mechanism design be applied to the project you want it to apply? Nobody knows.

let's use Yearn as a example, a DAO with a variety of products that generate income but has a lot of native tokens in the Treasury.

Some key differences are worth exploring... Opening up voting rights to all. No distributing of the Governance Tokens across various products.

what else am i missing? both positive and negative?